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Peer Sexual Harassment of High School Students:
A Reasonable Student Standard and an




Kathi Vonderharr was eighteen years old when she died.1
Statistically she will be listed as a teen suicide, but the story of her
death is much more; it is the story of a society that protects "boys
will be boys" behavior and of an innocent girl forced to fight for
dignity and self respect.
On January 11, 1985, when she was fifteen years old, Kathi
was assaulted. Her attacker was not the stranger young girls are
warned to fear; her attackers were two fifteen-year-old boys and a
fourteen-year-old boy, all of whom Kathi knew. And although the
assault had a traumatic effect on her, according to Bryce Fier, a
friend of the Vonderharr family, "I think she could have recovered
from the assault, but everything that happened afterward made it
much harder."
Kathi attended a youth hockey tournament in Rochester,
Minnesota, with a friend's family. Kathi, her girl friend, and that
friend's brother were in a motel room when several boys they
knew began to pound on the door. Kathi's friend's brother let the
boys in. As Kathi sat on the bed, three of the boys pulled up her
blouse and pulled down her pants. They then fondled her breasts
and vagina while the other boys watched.
Finally, all the boys left the room, but the three that as-
saulted Kathi returned. Saying they wanted to apologize, the
three were allowed to re-enter. One did apologize, but the other
two attacked Kathi again.
Not wanting to cause trouble, Kathi and her friend said noth-
* B.A. South Dakota State University. J.D. University of Minnesota Law
School, 1993.
1. The following narrative is based on information contained in Doug Grow,
Suicide Ended Kathi's "Fight for Dignity", MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIBUNE, July 5,
1987, at 1A.
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ing for a week. Then Kathi heard the three were bragging that
"they had screwed Kathi Vonderharr." Kathi told her parents,
and charges were filed.
As soon as news of the incident spread, the Vonderharr
phone began to ring. The calls were not calls of support and en-
couragement as one would expect when a child has been assaulted.
They were calls from people of the hockey association reminding
the Vonderharrs that "boys will be boys." One caller said to Mrs.
Vonderharr, "Don't you remember when you were sixteen? You
liked that when boys did that to you. You may have slapped their
face, but you liked it .... My sons bring girls to the house all the
time and I know they do that and I know the girls like it."
Two of the boys ultimately pled guilty to fourth degree sex-
ual assault,2 and the third was found guilty of the same offense in
juvenile court. The court placed the boys on probation until age
nineteen and ordered them to perform 570 hours of community
service each and to pay for Kathi's medical expenses related to the
assault.
Outside the courtroom, the verdict was sadly different. The
boys missed one hockey game. They became hockey heros with ar-
ticles about them in the yearbook and school and local newspapers.
One article had the school hockey coach speaking of two of the
boys' "hungry" and "aggressive" styles.
Ironically as Kathi's assailants became heros at school and in
the community, their victim became an outcast. Kathi's school
mates called her "slut," "bitch," and "whore." Once on her locker
she found scrawled, "Kill the bitch, she took our friends to court."
According to Kathi's mother, on one occasion when Kathi reported
to a vice principal the scrawls on the locker, she was told, "I've got
200 kids who were late for school. I've got to arrange their deten-
tion. Clean the locker yourself."
Although Kathi was bewildered by the experience at the high
school, she was determined not to change schools. However, some-
times at night she would say, "Oh, just let me slip away and be
free." On June 17, 1987, Kathi did slip away. She closed the ga-
rage door and started the car's ignition. When she was found, she
had her teddy bear and a picture of the people she loved.
Kathi's teen suicide is evidence of a society which has lost its
basic values-a society in which the victim of sexual assault is fre-
2. MINN. STAT. § 609.345 (1990) defines criminal sexual conduct in the fourth
degree: "A person who engages in sexual contact with another person is guilty of
criminal sexual conduct in the fourth degree if any of the following circumstances
exists.. . (c) the actor uses force or coercion to accomplish the sexual contact ... "
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quently treated as the guilty party. But Kathi's story is much
more. Kathi's story vividly illustrates the impact of the school's
environment upon its students, the difference between harassment
that occurs in high schools and that which occurs in the employ-
ment context, the need to formulate a refined legal standard by
which to judge sexual harassment in high schools and develop
comprehensive sexual harassment policies and procedures at the
high school level.
Sexual harassment is well-documented and analyzed in the
workplace. Legislation has been proposed and adopted in many in-
stances on the federal and state level to protect adult women, and
there is a continuously developing body of case law recognizing the
right to work in an atmosphere free from sexual harassment. In
recent years the public has also been jolted into awareness of sex-
ual harassment on the college campus, and universities and col-
leges have scrambled to develop policies.3
However, the recognition that sexual harassment does not
suddenly begin when young people graduate from high school and
leave home has been slow. Sexual harassment is prevalent in high
school in the guise of "teasing" and all too often the reaction to
such harassment is "boys will be boys." This article will examine
litigation on the issue of sexual harassment and argue that educa-
tion of young people, not remediation, is the most effective means
of ending peer sexual harassment of high school students. Part I
of the article will be an overview of the development of sexual
harassment law. Part II will review the litigation that has oc-
curred on the high school level in the context of peer sexual har-
assment. Part III, in addition to proposing a standard of peer
sexual harassment more suitable for high schools than the present
standard used in employment cases, proposes imposing an affirma-
tive duty on school districts to deal with sexual harassment. Part
IV will argue for policies, procedures, and training necessary to ed-
ucate students about and to protect students from peer sexual har-
assment while they are in high school.
Part I: The Development of Sexual Harassment Law
Sexual harassment is not a modern phenomenon, but it is
only in the last three decades that it has emerged as an issue. It
3. For a discussion of the issues and of higher education's reactions to sexual
harassment on the campus, see BILLIE W. DZIECH & LINDA WEINER, THE LECHER-
OUR PROFESSOR: SEXUAL HARASSMENT ON CAMPUS (1990); IVORY POWER: SEXUAL
HARASSMENT ON CAMPUS (Michele A. Paludi ed., 1990)
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was the surge of women into the workforce in the sixties4 which
created the societal consciousness that would gradually formalize
sexual harassment as a problem in need of a remedy.
Passage of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act 5 was the
seed for future sexual harassment litigation. Although its original
intent was to protect African-Americans, 6 the Act's impact signifi-
cantly broadened when Title VII, which dealt with employment
discrimination, was expanded to include sex discrimination. 7 Title
VII also created the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) to investigate employment discrimination complaints.
During the seventies, which was an era of activism, the con-
cept of sexual harassment became formalized.8 In 1972 Congress
passed the Equal Rights Amendment9 and forwarded it to the
states for ratification. However, the final deadline for ratification
passed in 1982 without the requisite vote of three-quarters (thirty-
eight) of the states. In 1972, Congress also passed the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Act (EEOA)1O and the Education Act
Amendments. x" The EEOA, in addition to giving enforcement
power to the EEOC, expanded coverage of Title VII.12 Title IX of
the Education Amendments prohibited sex discrimination in any
educational program or activity receiving federal funds.1S
Sexual harassment victims began suing under a variety of
4. Charles S. Clark, Sexual Harassment, 1 CQ RESEARCHER 537, 546 (Aug. 9,
1991). In 1959, 22 million women were in the workforce (33% of the workforce).
By 1991, there were 57 million women in the workforce (45.5% of the workforce).
Id.
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1981).
6. But see Jo Freeman, How "Sex" Got Into Title VII Persistent Opportunism
as a Maker of Public Policy, 9 LAW & INEQUALITY 163, 184 (1991) (arguing that the
addition of "sex" to Title VII was no fluke and that the success of committing the
federal government to the prohibition of sex discrimination in employment came
through persistence).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1981) provides: "It shall be an unlawful employment
practice for an employer-(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individ-
ual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compen-
sation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individuals
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."
8. See Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976). Sexual harassment
simply happened to women and did not have a name. Wendy Pollack, Sexual Har-
assment: Women's Experience vs. Legal Definition, 13 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 35, 41
(1990).
9. The text of the Equal Rights Amendment reads: "Equality of rights under
the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on
account of sex." H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); S.J. Res. 8, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1971).
10. Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972).
11. Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 235 (1972).
12. Clark, supra note 4, at 546.
13. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1990).
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laws,14 although Title VII was the principal vehicle, 15 and the
courts began the process of defining sexual harassment through
the broad prohibition of sex discrimination in the various statutes.
In developing sexual harassment law during the late seventies, the
courts first defined "quid pro quo" harassment in the workplace.16
"Quid pro quo" harassment "occurs when submission to sexual
14. Legal theories used in sexual harassment cases include statutory claims
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title IX of the 1972 Education
Amendments, and various state statutes; tort theories; contract theories; and insti-
tutional grievance procedures. Title VII can only be used in workplace harassment,
and its remedies were limited to equitable relief only until passage of the 1991 Civil
Rights Act. The EEOC, which is charged with enforcement of Title VII, has formu-
lated a definition of sexual harassment which has been relied upon in other statu-
tory claims.
Title IX is only useful in educational institutions receiving federal money. Un-
like Title VII, the Office of Civil Rights, which enforces Title IX, has not promul-
gated regulations concerning sexual harassment. Remedies under Title IX were
limited to termination of federal funding, attorney fees, and court costs until the
recent decision in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch. and William Prescott, 60
U.S.L.W. 4167 (U.S. Feb. 26, 1992)(No. 90-918). For a discussion of the case, see in-
fra notes 37-49 and accompanying text.
State statutes, such as the Minnesota Human Rights Act, Minn. Stat. § 363.03,
subd. 5 (1990), like Title IX, prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex within edu-
cational institutions but allow for monetary damages, lawyer's fees, and modest pu-
nitive awards as well as termination of state funding. However, these statutes have
a short claims period; in Minnesota filing must occur within one year after the oc-
currence of the harassment. In addition, some require exhaustion of administrative
remedies before civil action can be filed.
Tort theories, such as intentional infliction of emotional distress, battery, inva-
sion of privacy, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and negligent hiring, have
generally only been used in the workplace thus far, but if they were to gain accept-
ance in the educational setting, they would have great attractiveness for the victim
as tort theory can potentially provide the victim with extensive financial compensa-
tion.
Contract theories involving students have not been highly successful. Contract
theories require that a student pay tuition and thus establish a contract which in-
cludes the right to be free from sexual harassment.
For those who wish to avoid the scrutiny and publicity involved in a suit, insti-
tutional grievance procedures are a possible way to handle a complaint. Many edu-
cational institutions have tried to define and be responsive to sexual harassment of
their students. The procedures developed often provide for an informal resolution
system and a system for formal complaints. Sanctions vary from reprimand to re-
moval for cause. Courts will generally defer to action taken under school policy.
Linda J. Carpenter, Legal Issues: Sexual Harassment, J. PHYSICAL EDUC., RECREA-
TION & DANCE Apr. 1989, at 18; Judith B. Langevin & Thomas C. Kayser, Sexual
Harassment in Educational Institutions, TRIAL, June 1988, at 28, 29.
15. Title VII makes no mention of sexual harassment. See supra note 7. Those
that sued under Title VII argued that sexual harassment was a form of sex
discrimination.
16. See, e.g., Miller v. Bank of Am., 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979) (plaintiff dis-
charged when she refused to cooperate with her supervisor's sexual advances);
Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (plaintiff's job abolished after she
refused to submit to her supervisor's sexual advances); Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F.
Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd and remanded on other grounds sub nom. Williams
v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978), on remand sub nom. Williams v. Civilette,
Law and Inequality [Vol. 10:163
conduct is made a condition of concrete employment benefits."17
This form of harassment includes hiring and firing decisions and
changes in pay, promotion, job duties, or job conditions based on
acquiescence to sexual advances.18
In 1980, the EEOC issued guidelines that declared sexual har-
assment a violation of section 703 of Title VII, established criteria
for determining when unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature con-
stitutes sexual harassment, defined the circumstances under which
an employer may be held liable, and suggested affirmative steps an
employer should take to prevent sexual harassment. 19 The courts
in the early eighties accepted the EEOC definitions and began to
extend the definition of sexual harassment to include "hostile en-
vironment."20 This form of sexual harassment unreasonably inter-
feres with job performance or creates an environment that is
intimidating, hostile, or offensive, even if it leads to no tangible or
economic job consequences.2 '
487 F. Supp. 1387 (D.D.C. 1980) (plaintiff reprimanded and eventually terminated
for refusing to submit to her supervisor's sexual demands).
17. Hall v. Gus Constr., 842 F.2d 1010, 1013 (8th Cir. 1988).
18. Continental Can Co. v. State, 297 N.W.2d 241, 248 (Minn. 1980).
19. Key to the Guidelines is the definition of harassment:
Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of Sec. 703 of Title VII.
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other ver-
bal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute harassment when
(1) submission to such conduct is made explicitly or implicitly a term
or condition of an individual's employment, (2) submission to or rejec-
tion of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employ-
ment decisions affecting such individual, or (3) such conduct has the
purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's
work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive
working environment.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1991) [hereinafter "Guidelines"].
20. See, e.g., Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1983) (plaintiff's workplace
pervaded with sexual slurs, insults, and innuendo and plaintiff subjected to verbal
sexual harassment consisting of extremely vulgar and offensive sexually related ep-
ithets); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982) (plaintiff's supervi-
sor subjected her to numerous harangues of demeaning sexual inquiries and
vulgarities and repeated requests that she have sexual relations with him); 3undy
v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (plaintiff subjected to sexual propositions
by supervisors, and sexual intimidation was "standard operating procedure" in the
workplace).
21. Henson, 682 F.2d at 897. The Henson court justified its holding that a hos-
tile environment was sex discrimination by explaining that:
Sexual harassment which creates a hostile or offensive environment
for members of one sex is every bit the arbitrary barrier to sexual
equality at the workplace that racial harassment is to racial equality.
Surely, a requirement that a man or woman run a gauntlet of sexual
abuse in return for the privilege of being allowed to work and make a
living can be as demeaning and disconcerting as the harshest of racial
epithets. A pattern of sexual harassment inflicted upon an employee
because of her sex is a pattern of behavior that inflicts disparate treat-
ment upon a member of one sex with respect to the terms, condition,
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Finally in 1986 the Supreme Court for the first time in Mer-
itor Savings Bank v. Vinson22 addressed the issue of sexual har-
assment and firmly established that sexual harassment is a form of
sex discrimination actionable under section 703 of Title VII.23 The
Vinson court followed the Equal Employment Opportunity Guide-
lines and recognized both "quid pro quo" and "hostile environ-
ment" sexual harassment. 24
The Vinson Court found the gravamen of both "quid pro
quo" and "hostile environment" sexual harassment claims is that
the alleged sexual advances were "unwelcome." 25 The challenged
conduct must be unwelcomed "in the sense that the employee did
not solicit or incite it, and in the sense that the employee regarded
the conduct as undesirable or offensive." 26 Title VII does not serve
"as a vehicle for vindicating the petty slights suffered by the hy-
or privileges of employment. There is no requirement that an em-
ployee subjected to such disparate treatment prove in addition that she
has suffered tangible job detriment.
Id,
22. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
23. Id. at 64.
24. The Vinson court rejected the idea that the language of Title VII was lim-
ited to "economic" or "tangible" discrimination and found the phrase "terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment" to evince "a congressional intent to "'strike at
the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women' in employment."
477 U.S. at 64 (citations omitted).
The Supreme Court added however that "not all workplace conduct that may
be described as 'harassment' affects a 'term, condition, or privilege' of employment
within the meaning of Title VII. For sexual harassment to be actionable, it must be
sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of employment and create
an abusive working environment.'" Id. at 67 (citations omitted).
25. 477 U.S. at 68.
The fact that sex-related conduct was 'voluntary,' in the sense that the
complainant was not forced to participate against her will, is not a de-
fense to a sexual harassment suit brought under Title VII.... The cor-
rect inquiry is whether [the victim] by her conduct indicated that the
alleged sexual advances were unwelcome, not whether her actual par-
ticipation in sexual intercourse was voluntary.
Id.
However, the court added that "[w]hile voluntariness in the sense of consent is
not a defense to such a claim, it does not follow that a complainant's sexually pro-
vocative speech or dress is irrelevant as a matter of law in determining whether he
or she found particular sexual advances unwelcomed." Id. at 69.
26. Henson, 682 F.2d at 903. The record as a whole and the totality of the cir-
cumstances will be viewed on a case-by-case basis when the evidence is conflicting
as to "welcomeness." 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b) (1991).
Plaintiffs who go along with or put up with sexual harassment have a difficult
time convincing the court that they consented to the behavior but did not welcome
it. See, e.g., Weinsheimer v. Rockwell Intern. Corp., 754 F. Supp. 1559, 1564 (1990),
aff'd, Weinsheimer v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 949 F.2d 1162 (11th Cir. 1991) (plain-
tiff's involvement in sexual innuendo in work area indicated she did not find ma-
jority of such conduct unwelcome). But see, e.g., Swentek v. USAIR, Inc., 830 F.2d
552, 557 (4th Cir. 1987) (plaintiff's use of foul language or sexual innuendo does not
waive legal protection).
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persensitive." 27 Sexual flirtation or innuendo,28 even vulgar lan-
guage 29 that is trivial or merely annoying would probably not
establish a sexual harassment claim.30
The Vinson decision did not address the perspective from
which "welcomeness" of behavior is to be determined 31 and by
what standard employer liability is to be judged for harassment
perpetrated by supervisors32 and by co-employees.33 Although the
law is still emerging, today sexual harassment receives serious at-
tention in business. Businesses are creating sophisticated anti-har-
assment policies, grievance procedures, and training seminars
which are transforming the workplace.
Part II: Litigation of Sexual Harassment at the High School Level
Although there has been considerable litigation of sexual har-
assment in the employment context and an adoption of the EEOC
27. Zabkowicz v. West Bend Co., 589 F. Supp. 780, 784 (E.D. Wis. 1984).
28. See, e.g., Ferguson v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Co., Inc., 560 F. Supp.
1172, 1197-98 (D. Del. 1983).
29. See, e.g., Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 584 F. Supp. 419, 433 (D. Mich.
1984), aff'd, 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986); Downes v. F.A.A., 755 F.2d 288, 293 (Fed.
Cir. 1985).
30. See, e.g., Hall, 842 F.2d at 1017 ('Title VII does not mandate an employment
environment worthy of a Victorian salon. Nor do we expect that our holding today
will displace all ribaldry on the road way. One may well expect that in the heat
and dust of the construction site language of the barracks will always predominate
over that of the ballroom."); Continental Can, 297 N.W.2d at 249 ("[Title VII] does
not impose a duty on the employer to maintain a pristine working environment.").
See EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, NOTICE #N-915-050 7-14 (Mar.
19, 1990) [hereinafter EEOC] for a full discussion on determining whether sexual
conduct is unwelcomed and evaluating evidence of harassment.
31. Most courts have implicitly adopted the reasonable person standard. But
see Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991) (reasonable woman standard used
to evaluate welcomeness of advances); Lipsett v. U. Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 898
(1st Cir. 1988) (events should be viewed from the perspectives of both parties); Gra-
dine v. College of St. Scholastica, 426 N.W.2d 459 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (subjective
test based on the intentions of the perpetrator should be used).
However, seminars involved in the continuing legal education of employment
attorneys are now using the "reasonable woman" as the standard. Interview with
Marcy Crain, Employment Division Anoka County Attorney's Office, in Anoka,
Minn. (Feb. 7, 1991).
32. The Vinson court declined to define the federal standard for employer lia-
bility for hostile environment harassment by supervisors. The Court did, however,
reject that employers were automatically liable in hostile environment cases. 477
U.S. at 72. In "quid pro quo" cases, the federal courts have held the employers
strictly liable for harassment when supervisors perform or condone the offending
conduct. See, e.g., Horn v. Duke Homes, Inc., 755 F.2d 599, 604-06 (7th Cir. 1985);
Crimm v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 750 F.2d 703 (8th Cir. 1984).
33. The general standard used is whether the employer "knew or should have
known" of the behavior alleged to have created the hostile work environment and
failed to take appropriate steps to remedy the situation. Hall, 842 F.2d at 1010; Con-
tinental Can, 297 N.W.2d at 249.
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guidelines, 34 few cases of sexual harassment have been reported in
educational institutions.3 5 Most of the cases that have reached the
courts have involved harassment of a college student by a
professor. 36
However, the Supreme Court recently in Franklin v. Gwin-
nett County Public Schools and William Prescott 3 7 left no doubt
that sexual harassment of a high school student by a teacher is ac-
tionable under Title IX. In addition, the Court found that a dam-
age remedy is available for an action brought to enforce Title IX.
Affirming its decision in Cannon v. University of Chicago,3 s which
held that Title IX is enforceable through an implied right of ac-
tion, the Court held that "absent clear direction to the contrary by
Congress, the federal courts have the power to award any appro-
priate relief in a cognizable cause of action brought pursuant to a
federal statute."39
Franklin involved continual sexual harassment 40 of a high
school student, Christine Franklin, by a sports coach and teacher,
Andrew Hill, employed by Gwinnett High School in Gwinnett
County, Georgia.41 Franklin charged that when the school district
34. See supra notes 16-30.
35. The Minnesota Human Rights Department has handled 26 cases of alleged
sexual harassment in educational institutions since July of 1983. Of those only six
have been complaints from secondary or elementary students based on the "hostile
environment" principle. One case was dropped for lack of probable cause, three are
now being investigated. Rebecca Sisco, Sexual Harassment - Girls fight Back, MIN-
NESOTA WOMEN'S PRESS, Oct. 9, 1991, at 1A. For a discussion of the other two cases,
see infra notes 51-70 and accompanying text.
36. See, e.g., Bougher v. U. Pitt., 713 F. Supp. 139 (W.D. Pa. 1989), aff'd, 882
F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1989); LIpsett v. Rive-Mora, 669 F. Supp. 1188 (D.P.R. 1987), rev'd
sub nom., Lipsett v. U. Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir. (Puerto Rico) 1988), ap-
peal after remand, Lipsett v. U. Puerto Rico , 759 F. Supp. 40 (D.P.R. 1991); Moire
v. Temple U. Sch. Med., 613 F. Supp. 1360 (E.D. Pa. 1985), aff'd, 800 F.2d 1136 (3d
Cir. 1986); Alexander v. Yale U., 631 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1980). For a discussion of the
cited cases and as to why few complaints exist, see Kimberly A. Mango, Students
versus Professors: Combatting Sexual Harassment Under Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972, 23 CONN. L. REV. 355 (Winter, 1991).
37. 60 U.S.L.W. 4167 (U.S. Feb. 26, 1992)(No. 90-918).
38. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
39. Gwinnett, 60 U.S.L.W. at 4170.
40. Franklin, a student at North Gwinnett High School in Gwinnett County,
Georgia, alleged that she was subjected to continual sexual harassment beginning
the autumn of her tenth grade year. She charged that the teacher, Andrew Hill,
had engaged her in sexually-oriented conversations and asked about her sexual ex-
periences with her boyfriend and whether she would consider having sexual inter-
course with an older man. She also charged that he had forcibly kissed her on the
mouth in the school parking lot and that on three occasions in her junior year he
had interrupted a class, requested that the teacher excuse her, and taken her to a
private office where he subjected her to coercive intercourse. Id. at 4168.
41. Prior to bringing the lawsuit in federal court, Franklin had filed a com-
plaint with the Office of Civil Rights (OCR) of the United States Department of
19921
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became aware of the harassment and investigated it, the district
took no action to halt it and discouraged Franklin from pressing
charges. 42
The Court found that where intentional discrimination is al-
leged, sexual harassment of a student by a teacher is a form of sex
discrimination. The Court relying on its decision in Vinson stated:
Unquestionably, Title IX placed on the Gwinnett County
Schools the duty not to discriminate on the basis of sex, and
'when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate because of
the subordinate's sex, that supervisor 'discriminate[s]' on the
basis of sex.' We believe the same rule should apply when a
teacher sexually harasses and abuses a student.43
Franklin involved the unequal power between teacher and
student. Peer sexual harassment in the educational setting, how-
ever, is only beginning to emerge as an issue, but several ideas
have gained acceptance. First, although the Office for Civil Rights,
which is charged with enforcing Title IX's prohibition on sex dis-
crimination in education,44 has not promulgated regulations or
guidelines on sexual harassment, it maintains that sexual harass-
ment is prohibited by Title IX.45 This creates a presumption that
sexual harassment of students by peers as well as faculty members
is prohibited. Second, even though Title VII applies strictly to em-
ployment, a persuasive argument can be made for applying the
guidelines developed by the EEOC46 in a refined form to sexual
Education in August 1988. The OCR determined that the school district had vio-
lated Franklin's rights by subjecting her to physical and verbal sexual harassment
and by interfering with her right to complain about conduct proscribed by Title IX.
However, because of the resignations of the teacher-harasser, Andrew Hill, and Re-
spondent William Prescott and because the school had implemented a grievance
procedure, the OCR determined that the district had come into compliance with Ti-
tle IX and terminated its investigation. Id. n.3.
42. Hill resigned from the school district on the condition that all matters pend-
ing against him be dropped. The school then closed its investigation. Id.
43. Id. 4171 (citing Vinson, 477 U.S. at 64).
44. Title IX provides "[Except as otherwise provided] [n]o person in the United
States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benifits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activ-
ity receiving Federal financial assistance..." 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1990).
45. In an August 1981 policy memorandum, the OCR reaffirmed its jurisdiction
over sexual harassment complaints under title IX and adopted the following work-
ing definition: "Sexual harassment consists of verbal, or physical conduct of a sex-
ual nature, imposed on the basis of sex, by an employee or agent of a recipient that
denies, limits, provides different, or conditions the provision of aid, benefits, serv-
ices or treatment protected under title IX." OCR Policy Memorandum from
Antonio J. Califa, Director for Litigation, Enforcement, and Policy Service, to Re-
gional Civil Rights Directors (Aug. 31, 1981). Langevin & Kayser, supra note 14, at
29.
46. See supra note 19.
[Vol. 10:163
1992] PEER SEXUAL HARASSMENT
harassment claims in the educational environment.4 7 The EEOC
guidelines have proven workable in the employment context and
have been used in the analysis of professor-student harassment.
48
Finally, and most persuasive is the fact that the guidelines are al-
ready being used in state statutes prohibiting sexual harassment in
the educational setting.49 However, presently, no clear lines have
been drawn. Although Franklin clearly establishes that at mini-
mum sexual harassment of a student by a teacher is prohibited in
the educational environment,5 0 the issue of peer harassment is still
undecided.
Whereas "quid pro quo" harassment applies in a situation in-
volving unequal power, peer harassment has newly emerged as a
term that groups student-to-student problems such as sexist lan-
guage, date rape, hostile school environment, and sexual harass-
ment. Two cases in Minnesota are among the first in the nation in
which a high school student has successfully brought sexual har-
assment complaints dealing with peer harassment against a school
47. For a discussion of applying the Guidelines to sexual harassment claims in
the educational environment, see Mango, supra note 36; see also FRANK J. TILL,
THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COUNCIL ON WOMEN'S EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS, SEXUAL
HARASSMENT, A REPORT ON THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF STUDENTS, PART II 6-11
(Aug. 1980).
48. Moire, 613 F. Supp. at 1366-67 n.2 ("Though the sexual harassment doctrine
has generally developed in the context of Title VII, these guidelines seem equally
applicable to Title IX.").
49. See infra notes 51-70 and accompanying text.
50. See also Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720 (3d Cir. 1989).
In Stoneking, a former student, Kathleen Stoneking, brought a section 1983 civil
rights action against the school district and school officials alleging that she had
been sexually abused and harassed by a band director, Edward Wright, during her
years in high school. Id. at 722. Due to uncertainty in the law, the court did not
rest its decision on an affirmative duty of the school officials to protect students
under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Id at 723. The court, however, found
Stoneking could maintain her section 1983 action against school officials for estab-
lishing and maintaining, with deliberate indifference to the consequences, a policy,
practice or custom which directly caused her constitutional harm. Id, at 725. The
court found persuasive Stoneking's argument that these practices, customs or poli-
cies at a minimum created a climate which facilitated the abuse of students by
teachers and that there was a causal relationship between these practices and cus-
toms and the repeated sexual assaults against Stoneking. I& See also Alexander v.
Yale U., 459 F. Supp. 1 (D. Conn. 1977). The district court maintained that if sexual
harassment does occur, it may constitute sex discrimination prohibited under Title
IX:
It is perfectly reasonable to maintain that academic advancement con-
ditioned upon submission to sexual demands constitutes sex discrimi-
nation in education, just as questions of job retention or promotion
tied to sexual demands from supervisor have become increasingly rec-
ognized as potential violations of Title VII's ban against sex discrimi-
nation in employment.
Id. at 4.
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district.51 Both cases were brought under the Minnesota Human
Rights Statute.52 Using a definition for sexual harassment which
echoes the EEOC definition,5 3 the Minnesota State Department of
Human Rights investigated the charges and found probable cause54
for sexual harassment. In the first case [hereinafter referred to as
the Duluth case], the charging party and the respondent school
district arrived at a settlement in September 1991. The second
case [hereinafter referred to as the Chaska case] is still in the con-
ciliation process. 55
In the Duluth case, the charging party alleged that her
daughter was the subject of sexually offensive graffiti on the stall
walls in a bathroom in Duluth Central High School and that the
school district failed to take timely, appropriate action to remove
51. Minnesota Department of Human Rights, REF: 360 (1991) (Gorman, En-
forcement Supervisor); Minnesota Department of Human Rights, REF: 341 (1990)
(Lapinsky, Director); Jill Hodges, Chaska High Cited for Inaction in Sex Case:
Agency Acts on Girl's Complaint, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIBUNE, Oct. 3, 1991, at 7B.
52. Minn. Stat. § 363.03, subd. 5 (1990) provides:
It is an unfair discriminatory practice:
(1) to discriminate in any manner in the full utilization of or benefit
from any educational institution, or the services rendered thereby to
any person because of race, color, creed, religion, national origin, sex,
age, marital status, status with regard to public assistance or disability,
or to fail to ensure physical and program access for disabled persons
Id. Section 363.01, subd. 14 (1990) defines "discriminate": "IFlor purposes of dis-
crimination based on sex, it includes sexual harassment."
53. The Minnesota Human Rights Act defines sexual harassment to include:
unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, sexually moti-
vated physical contact or other verbal or physical conduct or communi-
cation of a sexual nature when: (1) submission to that conduct or
communication is made a term or condition, either explicitly or implic-
itly, of obtaining employment, public accommodations or public serv-
ices, education, or housing; (2) submission to or rejection of that
conduct or communication by an individual is used as a factor in deci-
sion affecting that individual's employment, public accommodations or
public services, education, or housing; or (3) that conduct or communi-
cation has the purpose or effect of substantially interfering with an in-
dividual's employment, public accommodations or public services,
education, or housing, or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive
employment, public accommodation, public services, educational, or
housing environment; and in the case of employment, the employer
knows or should know of the existence of the harassment and fails to
take timely and appropriate action.
MINN. STAT. § 363.01, subd. 41. (1990) (emphasis added).
54. Under MINN. STAT. § 363.06, subd. 4 (1990), once a charge has been filed
with the commission, an investigation of the allegations will be made. A finding of
probable cause is necessary for the charge to move either to conciliation or a hear-
ing. A decision that no probable case exists is not appealable to the Minnesota
Court of Appeals.
55. Hodges, supra note 44 at 7B.
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the graffiti and to eliminate the continuing harassment.5 6
Although the charging party notified the school district on re-
peated occasions between May 1988 and August 1989 and requested
that the graffiti be removed, the graffiti remained.57 The Human
Rights Department found that even if some of the graffiti was re-
moved in a timely manner vestiges of it remained or reappeared
on numerous occasions. 58
The Department also found that the school district did not
take sufficient affirmative measures to totally remove, monitor, or
discourage the sexual harassment until formal charges were filed
and that the school district had a responsibility to respond in a
"timely and increasingly aggressive manner to investigate and
remedy manifested sexual harassment and to affirmatively act to
halt continuing sexual harassment." 59 The Department further
found it would have been appropriate for the school district to edu-
cate its employees to respond to sexual harassment involving
students.60
After the Human Rights Department's finding of probable
cause, the parties failed to achieve conciliation, and the case was
given to the Minnesota Attorney General's Office where a settle-
ment agreement was reached61 The agreement included both re-
medial action by the district and monetary compensation for the
56. Minnesota Department of Human Rights, Ref: ED341 (1991) (Lapinsky,
Director).
57. Id. The school district claimed its policy was to check for and remove graf-
fiti daily and that "all possible reasonable steps were taken to remove graffiti."
However, the district acknowledged that graffiti that is scratched into the wall re-
mains until repainting is done. The district also claimed that "often graffiti reap-
pears daily after removal," and that it was "unable to prevent reappearance of the
graffiti since the perpetrators have never been suspected or identified." I& at 2.
58. Id,
59. Id. at 3. The school district was found not to have acted affirmatively. The
Department in its findings stated that the school district's timely and remedial ac-
tions should have included:
a) prompt removal of all sexual graffiti and any vestiges of graffiti re-
lating to Charging Party's daughter; b) additional attempts to identify
and then discipline the perpetrator(s); this reasonably could have been
done by monitoring and doing spontaneous spot checks of subject bath-
room; c) educational efforts to make the [district's] students aware of
[the district's] sexual harassment policies, which would include specifi-
cally identifying that graffiti of a sexual nature is a form of sexual har-




61. Although the school district denied it violated the Minnesota Human Rights
Act, to avoid delays, expenses and uncertainties of litigation, the parties agreed to a
settlement. Department of Human Rights, ED341-GSS5-6N (1991) (David Beaulieu,
Acting Commissioner).
Law and Inequality
victim. 62 The remedial action included the district's adopting and
posting a sexual harassment policy. The remedial action also re-
quired the district's aggressive commitment to eliminating and
preventing sexual harassment by providing staff development for
identification and prevention, classroom curriculum and instruc-
tion, student services, and student, staff, and community
participation. 63
In the Chaska case the charging party alleged that the school
district failed to take adequate action regarding complaints of sex-
ual harassment and that this lack of action contributed to an offen-
sive educational atmosphere. 64 The Department of Human Rights
found probable cause and noted that:
the student events and program activities complained about by
the Charging Party in the above investigation and the Respon-
dent in its inappropriate response to these complaints and
other complaints, creates an offensive atmosphere that pro-
motes sexual harassment in general, in the Respondents
school's programs and activities; and thus is in violation of
Minnesota Statutes 363.03 subd. 5(1).65
The charging party, a high school student, brought three spe-
cific charges that were found sufficient to create an offensive edu-
cational environment. First, the school district was found not to
have taken appropriate action on a specific student skit 66 and not
to have consistently taken effective action to eliminate activities
62. Id. The school district agreed to pay the victim $15,000 for alleged mental
anguish and suffering. Id. at 2.
63. Id. at Exhibit B.
64. Minnesota Department of Human Rights, Ref: ED360 (1991) (Gorman,
Supervisor).
65. Id, at 11.
66. Id at 6. A skit was performed in 1989 in which:
the male character had a mirror on his shoe and was looking up the
dress of a female character. The female character said something to
the effect of, 'Oh, don't look up my dress I don't have any panties on.'
The charging party complained to the school principal, but no discipli-
nary action was taken.
Id. at 1.
The school district argued that action to prevent discriminatory or offensive
material had been taken because the student council had frequently been counseled
by school personnel and had received training on sexual harassment, because a pol-
icy existed to review skits in advance by staff members, including the student coun-
cil advisor, principal, and assistant principal. Furthermore, respondent principal
and the student council advisor had met with the student performers and decided
no further disciplinary action was warranted. Id. at 4-5. The Human Rights De-
partment found that although respondent did talk to the individual performers, no
effective message was sent to the student body and staff that such presentations
were not acceptable behavior nor were any warnings or notice of specific kinds of
future consequences given to the student body if such behavior were to occur in the
future. Id at 5.
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and presentations of a discriminatory and offensive nature.67 Sec-
ondly, the school district was found not to have taken immediate
action when a student complained of explicit photographs of fe-
males on a male student's notebook.68 Finally, the school district
was found not to have taken appropriate action involving an offen-
sive list of female students circulated by male students.69 One
charge made by the student was found insufficient.70
67. There was evidence of other presentations and activities at the school. A lip
sync contest was performed in which "teen gals were dressed in lingerie (teddies)
and they sang a song titled "Sex Shooter" while making undulating movements
with their bodies in response to male students in the audience making cat calls and
sexual comments." I& at 5. There was another lip sync contest with girls dressed
in two piece swimsuits engaging in pelvic thrusting on male's upper thighs. rd. at 4-
5. The school had a "slave day" which involved students being led around by a leash
and collar who could be bought and sold by other students. L at 6. A skit was
performed "in which the opposing football team was composed of gay men with
bare chests, bows around their necks and effeminate behavior while fans were
mocked as being fat and opposing fans were nerds." Id at 6.
68. Id. at 8. A male student had sexually explicit photographs of females on his
folder in a humanities class. The charging party complained to a teacher who indi-
cated he would ask the student to remove the pictures. When nothing was done,
the charging party and another student complained to an assistant principal. The
attitude of the assistant principal was that the students were overly sensitive. The
male student was finally told by the teacher to get rid of the folder. Id. at 1.
The Department of Human rights found that sufficient evidence existed to
show that the school district did not take immediate action and that there was re-
luctance on part of the school to intervene. Id. at 8.
69. Id. at 7. In January 1990, a list was circulated by some male students rating
25 female students and how "f***able" they were. The list also included descrip-
tions of the female's anatomy and other sexual comments. When a teacher found
the list, it was given to a dean. When the charging party's mother asked what was
being done to let the student body know this was not acceptable, the dean stated,
"Nothing, we don't want to make a big deal out of this." She was also told that the
list had been thrown away. I& at 2.
The school district acknowledged that the list was circulated by unidentified
students. However, the district argued that several students were interviewed and
a complete investigation was discreetly conducted and that the district took precau-
tions to ensure the list was not further circulated. Furthermore, the district cited
its sexual harassment policy and efforts to educate staff and students. Id. at 3.
The Department of Human Rights found the district did not take appropriate
action in response to the list. Although the district did try to determine who wrote
the list, the action of simply destroying the list was not sufficient. The district's
"hush hush" attitude did nothing to educate the general school population. The dis-
trict's actions confirmed the students' perceptions that the sexual harassment pol-
icy was vague and without tangible consequence. This promoted confusion, rumors,
and uncertainty among the students about what is offensive behavior. I& at 7.
70. The school decided to put paper on the restroom walls to curb writing on
the walls. The charging party alleged that after the paper was put up, the amount
of sexually explicit graffiti increased and that the school refused to address the
problem. I& at 1.
The school district acknowledged the paper did not discourage graffiti but that
the principal had decided the paper was to stop being posted in the fall of 1990.
The Human Rights Department found insufficient evidence existed to show
that the amount of sexually explicit school restroom graffiti increased or that the
school district refused to address the problem. Id at 11.
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What seems clear from these two decisions is that a willing-
ness exists to transfer the definition of sexual harassment used in
the employment context7 ' into the educational setting72 at least
where state statute includes sexual harassment as a form of sex
discrimination. In both the Duluth and Chaska cases the finding of
probable cause rested on the creation of an offensive environment
and on the inaction of the school district to take affirmative action
to end peer sexual harassment.
Part III: A Reasonable Student Standard and an Affirmative Duty in
Peer Sexual Harassment of Hight School Students
With the growing recognition that sexual harassment occurs
between students in the high school setting and that it may be sub-
ject to legal action,73 distinctions must be drawn between harass-
ment in the workplace and peer harassment that occurs in high
schools. Two areas in particular need refining: the standard by
which to judge whether harassment has occurred and the duty of
the school district as opposed to the duty of the employer to elimi-
nate sexual harassment.
To determine whether sexual harassment is sufficiently se-
vere to create a hostile environment in the employment context,74
the courts generally use an objective standard of a "reasonable
person."75 Thus, if a reasonable person's work environment would
not be substantially affected by the harassment, no violation exists.
However, this objective standard is not applied in a vacuum, and
the context in which the alleged harassment took place must be
71. See Guidelines supra note 19.
72. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. But see Mango, supra note 36
(discussing the resistance in the Federal Circuits to apply Title VII Guidelines to
claims of sexual harassment in the educational setting).
73. But see D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Tech. Sch., 1991 WL 276292
(No.) (3d Cir.). In Middle Bucks, two minor female students alleged that they were
physically, verbally and sexually molested by several male students over several
months in parts of the graphic arts classroom. Id at 1. In a section 1983 civil rights
action against the school district and teachers and officials, the females contended
that the defendants knew of the abuse and maintained a lax policy toward such
conduct. Id. at 2. Finding that the compulsory attendance laws did not create a
special custodial relationship between schools and students, the court dismissed the
complaint for failure to state a constitutional duty that the individual defendants
could have breached. Id. at 5. In addition, the court found that the school district
could not be held liable for deliberately and recklessly establishing and maintaining
a custom, practice or policy which caused harm to a student because there was no
violation by state actors. Id. at 5-6. Here, the underlying violative acts were com-
mitted by private actors, namely the male students. Id. at 6.
74. The Vinson court did not answer whose perspective should be used in de-
termining the "unwelcomeness" of behavior. See supra note 31 for the standards
used by the courts.
75. EEOC, supra note 30, at 15.
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considered.76 Furthermore, the victim's perspective and not stere-
otyped notions of acceptable behavior should be considered77
Recently, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected
the "reasonable person" standard and adopted a "reasonable wo-
man" standard in Ellison v. Brady.7 S The court adopted the stan-
dard of the
reasonable woman primarily because we believe that a sex-
blind reasonable person standard tends to be male-biased and
tends to systematically ignore the experiences of women ....
Instead, a gender-conscious examination of sexual harassment
enables women to participate in the workplace on an equal
footing with men. By acknowledging and not trivializing the
effects of sexual harassment on reasonable women, courts can
work towards ensuring that neither men nor women have to
"run the gauntlet of sexual abuse in return for the privilege of
being allowed to work and make a living."'79
The court noted that the standard they adopted would classify con-
duct as unlawful sexual harassment even when the harasser did
not realize that his conduct created a hostile working environ-
ment: "Well-intentioned compliments by co-workers or supervi-
sors can form the basis of a sexual harassment cause of action if a
reasonable victim of the same sex as the plaintiff would consider
comments sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter a condition of
employment and create an abusive working environment." 80
In finding a standard that is appropriate for peer harassment
at the high school level three ideas must be kept in mind. First is
the problem that "girls do not readily name the behavior as un-
wanted for they have become inured to it."81 Secondly, sexual
76. Id at 15-16. See, e.g., Highlander v. K.F.C. Nat'l. Mgmt. Co., 805 F.2d 644,
650 (6th Cir. 1986) (Trier of fact must "adopt the perspective of a reasonable per-
son's reaction to a similar environment under similar or like circumstances.").
77. EEOC, supra note 30, at 16.
78. 924 F.2d at 872.
79. I& at 879-80. In a dissenting opinion, Judge Stephens questioned the prem-
ise of the standard:
It is clear that the authors of the opinion intend a difference between
the 'reasonable woman' and the 'reasonable man' in Title VII cases on
the assumption that men do not have the same sensibilities as women.
This is not necessarily true. A man's response to circumstances faced
by women and their effect upon women can be and in given circum-
stances may be expected to be understood by men.
Id. at 884.
80. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 872. The court noted that where male employees allege
that co-workers engage in conduct which creates a hostile environment, the appro-
priate victim's perspective would be that of a reasonable man. IM at 879 n.11.
81. Carrie M. Herbert, Talking of Silence: The Sexual Harassment of School-
girls 23 (1989); See also Linda Owen & Cynthia Boyd, Schools Taking New Steps to
Deal with Sexual Harassment, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS DISPATCH, Dec. 29, 1991, at
Al; Sisco, supra note 35.
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harassment passes as unremarkable in schools because the line be-
tween what constitutes normal male behavior and aberrant behav-
ior is unclear.82 It would be an injustice to label as illegal that
which the participants have as yet been unable to name or that
which has not been clearly viewed as beyond the limits of normal
behavior. Finally, there must be a recognition of the natural flirta-
tions and sexual interest that occurs between high school students
that stops short of sexual harassment.83
A "reasonable student" would be the most appropriate stan-
dard to use in determining whether the educational environment 84
would be substantially affected by the alleged sexual harassment.
This "reasonable student" would be based on the assumption that
the student is somewhat educated on the issue. In addition, a rea-
sonable female student standard would be applied for allegations
made by a female student and a reasonable male student standard
for allegations made by a male student. This standard has several
advantages. The greatest advantage would be that while the stan-
dard would not address conduct which some students find offen-
sive, it is not static, and conduct considered harmless today by
many might be considered discriminatory in the future. Education
of students would serve to change the views of reasonable stu-
dents,85 thus, changing the standard of acceptable behavior.8 6 In
addition, a "reasonable student" standard takes into account the
age and sensibilities of those affected in a similar environment
under similar circumstances. Finally, the "reasonable student"
82. Herbert, supra note 81, at 23; Owen & Boyd, supra note 81, at 8A; Sisco,
supra note 35, at 10.
83. A much criticized sexual harassment policy now in effect at Amherst Re-
gional High School in Massachusetts defines the following behaviors from a peer as
sexual harassment: "staring or leering with sexual overtones, spreading sexual gos-
sip, unwanted sexual comments, pressure for sexual activity, and unwanted physi-
cal contact of a sexual nature." Slow Times at Amherst High, HARPER'S Apr. 1991,
at 32. See also John Leo, What Qualifies as Sexual Harassment?, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REPORT, Aug. 13, 1990, at 17.
84. In the employment context, the courts have noted that "hostile environ-
ment" harassment takes a variety of forms and many factors affect the determina-
tion if a hostile environment exists:
(1) whether the conduct was verbal or physical, or both; (2) how fre-
quently it was repeated; (3) whether the conduct was hostile and pa-
tently offensive; (4) whether the alleged harasser was a co-worker or
a supervisor; (5) whether others joined in perpetrating the harass-
ment; and (6) whether the harassment was directed at more than one
individual.
EEOC, supra note 30, at 15.
85. See infra notes 88-92 and accompanying text on affirmative duty of the
school district to educate students on sexual harassment and to enforce sexual har-
assment policies.
86. This parallels the justification used in Ellison in applying a "reasonable wo-
man" standard. 924 F.2d at 879 n.12.
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standard allows for that acceptable degree of flirtation and sexual
interest that naturally occurs between students without crossing
the line of creating a hostile environment.
To make the "reasonable student" standard a workable stan-
dard in peer harassment, the responsibility of the school district
must be viewed differently than the responsibility of the employer.
In the employment context, the employer is liable for co-employee
sexual harassment which creates a hostile environment if the em-
ployer "knew or should have known" of the behavior and failed to
take appropriate steps to remedy the problem.8 7
Educational institutions must be held to a higher standard.
The relationship between a student and an educational institution
is significantly different than the relationship between the em-
ployee and the employer. A student's tenure is of a short length,
and any individual student has little ability to bring about change.
Essentially the student has no where else to go and does not have
the option to change jobs to escape from the hostile environment.
The institution serves as the parent and the student's "home away
from home" for seven or more hours of the day, and generally leg-
islators have adopted protectionist and paternalistic laws to protect
those of school age.8s Additionally, the student, through the tax-
payer, is actively purchasing an education,8 9 and thus, the obliga-
tion of the institution is to provide a learning environment free
from distractions such as peer sexual harassment.90
This difference between employers and educational institu-
tions argues that schools have an affirmative duty to their students
to create an environment free of harassment and to develop good
citizens. Unlike the affirmative duty of employers which only
arises when the employer "know[s] or should have known" of the
87. Hall, 842 F.2d at 1010 (company will be liable if management-level employ-
ees knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known, about a barrage
of offensive conduct); Continental Can, 297 N.W.2d at 249 (company liable when it
fails to investigate or take other action to curtail similar occurrences after a com-
plaint has been lodged); Minn. Stat. § 363.01, subd. 41(3) (1991).
88. Mango, supra note 36, at n.9.
89. TILL, supra note 47, at 10.
90. Id. MINN. STAT. § 363.01, subd. 41(3) (1990) makes a distinction between the
affirmative duty in the educational context and the less restrictive "know or should
have known" duty in the employment context:
(3) that conduct or communication has the purpose or effect of sub-
stantially interfering with an individual's employment, public accom-
modations or public services, education, or housing, or creating an
intimidating, hostile, or offensive employment, public accommoda-
tions, public services, educational, or housing environment; and in the
case of employmen4 the employer knows or should know of the exist-




harassment, a school's affirmative duty clearly arises earlier.
Whereas, employers are only encouraged and not required by law
to have sexual harassment policies,91 school districts by federal
law under Title IX should be required to have explicit sexual har-
assment policies, procedures, and training programs which serve to
prevent sexual harassment, not to just react once an incident has
happened.92
This affirmative duty placed on secondary schools to prevent
as well as to react to sexual harassment would force schools to pro-
vide the environment free of harassment that is necessary for
learning and that is the right of every student.
PART IV: Creation of Policies and Procedures to Educate Students
on and to Protect Students from Peer Sexual
Harassment
In keeping with the school district's affirmative duty to not
merely address peer sexual harassment when it happens, the dis-
trict must take steps to prevent sexual harassment before it hap-
pens by educating its students about sexual harassment. The first
step in this affirmative process is to acknowledge that sexual har-
assment is not solely a women's issue and that much hostile envi-
ronment harassment, especially peer harassment by high school
students, is carried out by those lacking a sensitivity to the issue
rather than by those intending to harass.
The total elimination of sexual harassment would require
overwhelming change in societal attitudes, but this does not mean
that affirmative steps cannot be taken to remedy parts of the prob-
lem. Schools are the logical and manageable place for this change
to begin.93 Schools need policies and training activities to ensure
91. EEOC Guidelines encourage employers to
take all steps necessary to prevent sexual harassment from occurring,
such as affirmatively raising the subject, expressing strong disap-
proval, developing appropriate sanctions, informing employees of their
right to raise and how to raise the issue of harassment under Title VII,
and developing methods to sensitize all concerned.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(f) (1991).
92. In 1989, Minnesota enacted a law requiring all educational institutions in
the state to develop policies on sexual harassment and sexual violence. However,
these policies only need to provide for a grievance procedure once an incident has
happened and do not require the school district to educate students about sexual
harassment. Minn. Stat. § 127.455-.46 (Supp. 1989). See also Minn. Stat. § 128C.20
(Supp. 1989) (sexual harassment policy for Minnesota High School League).
93. Schools have long been used by society to promote those values beyond the
teaching of the "3 Rs" which have been identified as important in creating a just
society where each person has the opportunity to reach his or her full potential.
Recently, schools have been leaders in acknowledging the rights of the handicap
through mainstreaming programs. Schools teach sex and AIDS education; they of-
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that their students and staff understand when sexual harassment
has occurred and understand how to appropriately deal with it.
However, even more important for long term change, schools must
educate students on sexual harassment so that it does not happen.
To effectuate meaningful and lasting change school districts
must make a commitment to a curriculum that specifically ad-
dresses sexual harassment early in the high school years and that
generally promotes sex equity. The specific curriculum could eas-
ily be offered as a short unit as a part of a health or social studies
class. The goal of the unit would be to sensitize students to the
reasons for and the effects of sexual harassment.
In the shorter term, schools must be concerned with the peer
sexual harassment that is presently occurring. The key element
for prevention is adoption and implementation of clear policies and
procedures which include a basic definition of what constitutes
sexual harassment and a strong policy statement of what will not
be tolerated; effective communication to inform students and staff
about that policy; education designed to aid all elements of the
school to recognize and discourage sexual harassment; and an ac-
cessible grievance procedure.94
First, schools should develop a clear policy statement prohib-
iting sexual harassment.95 This statement of policy should include
a definition of sexual harassment 96 and explicitly state that it is a
fer courses in family living and career development. For a very long time, health
and physical education have been a part of the curriculum because society believes
this is the most effective and efficient place to bring about change which will have a
positive and lasting effect.
94. DZIECH & WEINER, supra note 3, at 200.
95. Robert H. Decker, Can Schools Eliminate Sexual Harassment?, EDUCATION
DIGEST, Jan. 1989, at 59.
96. See, e.g., INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT 709, SExuAL HARASSMENT POLICY
1. Another schools district's policy states that:
Sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination which violates Sec-
tion 703 of Title VII of the Civil Right Act of 1964, as amended, 42
U.S.C. 2000e, et seq., and Minnesota Statutes, Chapter 363, the Minne-
sota Human Rights Act .... Sexual harassment consists of unwelcome
sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, sexually motivated physi-
cal conduct or other verbal or physical conduct or communication of a
sexual nature when
1. Submission to that conduct or communication is a term or condi-
tion, either explicitly or implicitly, or of obtaining or retaining employ-
ment, or of obtaining an education; or
2. Submission to or rejection of that conduct or communication by an
individual is used as a factor in decisions affecting that individual's em-
ployment or education; or
3. That conduct or communication has the purpose or effect of sub-
stantially or unreasonably interfering with an individual's employment
or education, or creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive employ-
ment or education environment.
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violation of this policy for any student or employee to harass an-
other student or employee. The policy should also specifically
enumerate what constitutes sexual harassment.97 In the develop-
ment of these policy statements, input should be sought from all
aspects of the school community: students, parents, staff, and ad-
ministration. It is not enough that administrators sit behind closed
doors and decide what behaviors constitute sexual harassment for
high school students. They must involve all the parties concerned
with the issue.
Once the policy is developed, effective communication of that
policy is necessary. The mere printing of a policy in a handbook
does not constitute putting the school community on notice. The
policy must be publicized, disseminated, and highlighted. It should
be posted in highly visible areas and be discussed in homerooms or
in designated classes during the first week of school. Ideally, all
students would receive age-appropriate information including a
copy of the district's policy with its purpose, instructions on what
to do if sexually harassed, clear delineations of sanctions against
anyone found to have been a perpetrator of sexual harassment, in-
formation on consequences of frivolous accusations, and a safe and
supportive forum for discussion on the issue.98
Along with communication of the policy, discussion should
take place which would allow for minimal education of students on
the issue. Ideally, classroom instruction would occur to ensure
that students learn how to deal with sexual harassment and how
'to treat each other with courtesy and respect. Equally important
with student instruction is staff development. Training at teacher
workshops is crucial for employees to broaden their knowledge of
sexual harassment and to identify when it is happening in the
school environment and to respond appropriately.
INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT 911, SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE
1-2.
97. See, e.g., INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRIcT 709 at 1-2; INDEPENDENT SCHOOL
DISTRICT 911 at 2. One policy uses the following definition:
Sexual harassment may include but is not limited to a. verbal, writ-
ten/graphic harassment or abuse; b. subtle pressure for sexual activ-
ity; c. inappropriate patting or pinching;, d. intentional brushing
against the individual's body; e. demanding sexual favors accompanied
by implied or overt threats concerning an individual's employment or
educational status; f. demanding sexual favors accompanied by implied
or overt promises of preferential treatment with regard to an individ-
ual's employment or educational status; g. any unwelcome touching of
a sexual nature.
MINNESOTA STATE HIGH SCHOOL LEAGUE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND SEXUAL VIO-
LENCE IN MSHSL-SPONSORED ATHLETIC AND FINE ARTS AcTIvITIEs 53.




When sexual harassment occurs, the school must provide ac-
cessible grievance procedures. A school district should consider
creating multiple routes for receiving complaints which will pro-
vide for safe alternatives for all victims.99 The procedure should
provide for students to report either verbally or in writing to a
teacher, to a counselor, to a building principal, or to a designated
person. A short time period, usually 24 hours, must be required for
committing the complaint into writing and forwarding it to the dis-
trict official designated in charge of the policy. Respecting the
confidentiality of the complainant and the individual(s) against
whom the complaint is filed must be followed as much as possible
consistent with legal obligations and the necessity to investigate al-
legations of the claim and to take disciplinary action.10 0
The procedure should provide for an immediate investigation
of the complaint and a time limit on when a formal report must be
submitted. The investigation, which may consist of personal inter-
views and any other methods and documents deemed pertinent by
the investigator, should consider the surrounding circumstances,
the nature of the sexual conduct, relationships between the parties
involved, and the context in which the alleged incident(s) oc-
curred.1o' Whether a particular action or incident constitutes sex-
ual harassment must be based on all the facts and surrounding
circumstances.102
Finally, the school needs to offer services and aid to students
who have been sexually harassed by a peer. Most important of all,
the school district must enforce the established policies with im-
partiality and consistency including due process for each person in-
volved.103 The inappropriate response is to keep the matter "hush-
hush" in hopes that it will go away. Swift action sends a strong
message.l0 4
The goal of the district is to provide a learning and working
environment for its students and staff free from peer sexual
harassment.
99. Decker, supra note 94, at 59.
100. INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DIsmICT 709, supra note 95, at 3; INDEPENDENT
SCHOOL DISTRICT 911, supra note 95, at 3.
101. For a comparison with employment guidelines in evaluation whether a hos-
tile environment exists, see supra note 83.
102. Id,
103. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (young people do not shed their con-
stitutional rights at the schoolhouse door).




When Kathi Vonderharr was experiencing the indignity of
being called "slut," "whore," and "bitch" by her peers in the mid-
eighties, there was little that she could do to fight back other than
to depend on the sensitivity of those in official positions in the
school district and to continue as best she could. Although sexual
harassment litigation was in full bloom in the employment context
and the Supreme Court in Vinson had found "hostile environ-
ment" sexual harassment illegal, for Kathi the opening of the door
of silence that surrounds sexual harassment by peers in the educa-
tional setting came too late.
That door was opened wider by the Duluth and Chaska deci-
sions in which peer sexual harassment creating an "offensive envi-
ronment" was found illegal in high schools and where the school
district was liable for failing to take timely and adequate affirma-
tive action to stop the illegal behavior.
Although peer harassment of high school students will un-
doubtedly be litigated under those theories developed in the em-
ployment context of "hostile environment" and "quid pro quo"
harassment, two distinctions must be made from employment liti-
gation. First, in peer harassment of high school students rather
than the employment "reasonable person" standard a "reasonable
student" standard would better provide for the flexibility and fair-
ness necessary in evaluating whether a "hostile environment" ex-
isted. Secondly, unlike in the employment context where
affirmative policies to prevent sexual harassment before it hap-
pens is only encouraged, in the high school setting an affirmative
duty must be imposed on school districts.
Not only must school districts react to incidents of sexual
harassment but they also must affirmatively attack peer sexual
harassment aggressively both before it happens and once it has
happened.
For school districts to assume this affirmative duty, it is nec-
essary that they develop policies and procedures that not only pro-
tect students from peer harassment once it has happened but that
they develop methods to educate the entire school community in-
cluding students and staff. The school represents a manageable
and effective arena for change. It can make a difference in atti-
tudes that will eventually lead to the creation of a respect between
all men and women.
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